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CORPORATE DIRECTORS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE*
ABSTRACT
In the United States, state corporation law uniformly provides that
only natural persons may serve as directors of corporations. Corpora-
tions, limited liability companies, and other entities otherwise rec-
ognized in the law as legal persons are prohibited from so serving. In
contrast, the United Kingdom allowed legal entities to serve as di-
rectors of a company. In 2015, however, legislation came into force
adopting a general prohibition of these so-called corporate directors,
albeit while contemplating some exemptions. This Article argues that
there are legitimate reasons companies may wish to appoint cor-
porate directors. It also argues that the transparency and account-
ability concerns that motivated the legislation are overstated. The
requisite enhancement of transparency and accountability can be
achieved without a sweeping ban. Accordingly, this Article proposes
that Parliament either repeal the ban or, at least, authorize liberal
exemptions.
* William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its controversial
Citizens United decision, the concept of corporate personhood has
been highly controversial in the United States.1 Yet, despite the
ongoing controversy, it has long been settled law that corporations
have most—but not all—of the rights and powers of natural per-
sons.2 One exception to that general rule, however, is that only
natural persons may serve as directors of a corporation.3 The same
is true in most other major capitalist economies.4
1. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). For overviews of the
controversy surrounding Citizens United and other recent election law issues, see Richard L.
Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but with
Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2016); and Bradley A. Smith,
Disclosure in a Post-Citizens United Real World, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 257
(2012).
2. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 346-47 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A]
wide variety of constitutional rights may be asserted by corporations.”); Ehlinger v. Hauser,
785 N.W.2d 328, 365 (Wis. 2010) (“[A] corporation ... has the same powers as a natural person
to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs.” (quoting WIS.
STAT. § 180.0302 (2010))).
3. Section 141(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), for example, pro-
vides that a director “shall be a natural person.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (West 2016).
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) accomplishes the same result in a two-step
process. First, section 8.03(a) provides that a board of directors “shall consist of one or more
individuals.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). Second, section 1.40
defines individual as “a natural person.” Id. § 1.40. Accordingly, under both statutes, non-
natural legal persons—such as corporations and other forms of business organizations—
cannot serve as members of a board of directors.
The law is the same in other states. See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation v. Ute Distrib. Corp., No. 2:06-cv-557 CW, 2010 WL 956905, at *5 (D. Utah Mar.
12, 2010) (“Utah statute specifies that a director must be a natural person who is at least
eighteen-years-old.”), aff’d, 455 F. App’x 856 (10th Cir. 2012); NFL Props., Inc. v. Superior
Court of Santa Clara Cty., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 899 n.5 (Ct. App. 1998) (“A director of a
corporation must be a natural person, pursuant to [California] Corporations Code section
164.”); Michael A. Budin, Prepare LLC Documents with Care—Issues to Consider to Achieve
the Desired Results for Your Client, 74 PA. B. A’SSN Q. 27, 36 n.30 (2003) (“Section 1722(a) of
the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law requires each director of a business corporation
to be a natural person.”); see also Shawn J. Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-
Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 98 (2015)
(“This restriction is standard across American law.”).
4. See, e.g., Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 201B(1) (Austl.) (“Only an individual who is
at least 18 may be appointed as a director of a company.”); Canada Business Corporations Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c C-44.105 (disqualifying any “person who is not an individual” from serving on
a corporate board of directors); Companies Act 1993, s 151 (N.Z.) (stating that only a “natural
3
Bainbridge: Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom
Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018
68 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 59:065
Until recently, however, the United Kingdom stood as a glaring
exception to the general rule. For over a century, U.K. company law
allowed a corporation or other legal entity to serve on the board of
directors of another company.5 In 2015, however, Parliament ap-
proved legislation containing a ban—albeit allowing some yet to be
defined exemptions—of corporate directors.6 As of this writing (fall
2017), the ban has not been implemented, but it was expected to
come into force soon.7
This Article argues that there are legitimate reasons for com-
panies to use corporate directors. In work done elsewhere with Uni-
versity of Chicago Professor of Law Todd Henderson, I propose that
U.S. law be modified to permit legal entities to serve as corporate
directors.8 That proposal is intended to permit the rise of service
companies—so-called Board Service Providers (BSPs)—that would
serve on or, preferably, as a company’s board of directors.9 In our
view, BSPs offer a number of advantages over natural persons as
directors.10 This is not an appropriate forum in which to rehash
those arguments. For present purposes, suffice it to say that if the
U.K. ban goes forward, the U.K. would be foreclosing the opportuni-
ty for its companies to experiment with the BSP model. In addition,
person” who is not otherwise disqualified “may be appointed as a director of a company”); see
also GU MINKANG, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COMPANY LAW 172 (2d ed. 2010) (stating that
the Mandatory Provisions for the Articles of Association of Companies to be Listed Outside
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) prohibit “a non-natural person from being a director of
a company listed outside the PRC”); Barry Conway & Aoife Kavanagh, A New Departure in
Irish Company Law: The Companies Act 2014—An Overview, 16 BUS. L. INT’L 135, 151 (2015)
(stating that Ireland has long prohibited corporate directors).
5. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant U.K. law).
6. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the legislation). In the United
States, the term “corporate director” likely would be understood to mean a member of the
board of directors of a corporation. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 31-21-2(8) (2013) (“‘Corporate
directors’ means the members of the board of directors of the corporation.”). In the U.K.,
however, the term is used to mean a member of the board of directors of a company that “is
not a natural or real person, [but] instead ... a company.” Company Formations: What Is a
Corporate Director?, WISTERIA FORMATIONS (Mar. 18, 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/
20100324131649/http://www.wisteriaformations.co.uk:80/ [https://perma.cc/CV9T-69XC]. The
term will be given its U.K. meaning in this Article.
7. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing delayed implementation of
the ban).
8. Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2014).
9. Id. at 1068-69 (outlining BSP proposal). 
10. See id. at 1074-96 (setting out anticipated advantages of the BSP model). 
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even where the corporate director is not a specialist BSP, but rather
a normal business company, there are still advantages to allowing
corporations to serve as corporate directors.11
This Article also evaluates the reasons offered for restricting
corporate directors to natural persons and finds them wanting. It
therefore proposes that the U.K. government either repeal the
relevant legislation or, at least, be liberal in granting exemptions to
the natural person restriction. Part I briefly traces the history of
corporate directors under U.K. law. Part II argues that there are
several legitimate reasons for companies to use corporate directors.
Part III summarizes the arguments advanced in favor of the
legislation restricting the use of corporate directors. Finally, Part IV
critiques those arguments.
I. CORPORATE DIRECTORS UNDER U.K. LAW
Prior to 2006, the U.K. had no restrictions on the appointment of
a corporation as a director of another company.12 As a widely cited
1907 Chancery Division decision explained, for example, under the
Companies Act of 1862 there was “nothing ... which in any way
ma[de] it incumbent on a company ... to have directors who shall be
individual persons and responsible as individuals to the sharehold-
ers.”13 This remained the rule for the next century.14
The corporate director option apparently was rarely used, al-
though the exact numbers are difficult to find. A 2013 survey of U.K.
companies found that approximately 38,000 companies (1.2 percent
of all U.K. companies) had one or more corporate directors.15 In
11. See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text (discussing advantages). 
12. See Jason Ellis, The Continued Appointment of Corporate Directors: An Examination
of the Effect of S.87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, 37 COMPANY
LAW. 203, 203 (2016) (“Prior to the Companies Act 2006, any legal person (either a company
or a limited liability partnership) could assume the office of a director.”).
13. In re Bulawayo Mkt. & Offs. Co. [1907] 2 Ch 458 at 463 (UK).
14. See Len Sealy, Paycheck Services 3 Ltd: The Supreme Court Reviews the Concept of the
De Facto Director, 287 COMPANY L. NEWSL. 1, 3 (2011) (“English company law has, for over
a century, recognised that a company may be a director of another company.”).
15. DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, CORPORATE DIRECTORS: SCOPE OF EXCEPTIONS
TO THE PROHIBITION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 4 & n.2 (2014) [hereinafter EXCEPTIONS
PAPER], https://www.icsa.org.uk/assets/files/pdfs/guidance/Consultations%202014/bis-14-1017-
scope-of-exceptions-to-prohibition-of-corporate-directors.pdf [https://perma.cc/76MR-PCAA].
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contrast, however, a 2014 government report found 67,000 compa-
nies with corporate directors (2.1 percent of all companies).16 In ei-
ther case, the majority of companies with one or more corporate
directors were nonpublic and small in size,17 presumably because
stock exchange listing standards effectively require directors to be
natural persons.18
Recent changes in U.K. company law likely will result in a sub-
stantial decline in the number of corporate directors, if not their
complete abolition. Since the adoption of the Companies Act of 2006,
U.K. law has required that a company “have at least one director
who is a natural person.”19 This provision was understood to permit
corporate directors to continue serving on company boards, but only
so long as at least one board member was a natural person.20
The status of corporate directors underwent a further restriction
in 2015 with passage of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employ-
ment Act (SBEEA), which amended the Companies Act to provide
that “[a] person may not be appointed a director of a company
unless the person is a natural person.”21 Existing non-natural
person directors of U.K. companies originally were to be phased out
by October 2017, but in September 2016 the U.K. government
indefinitely postponed implementation of the ban.22 It did so for the
16. DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, FINAL STAGE IMPACT ASSESSMENTS TO PART A
OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST PROPOSALS (COMPANIES TRANSPARENCY) 155 (2014)
[hereinafter IMPACT ASSESSMENTS PAPER], https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/324712/bis-14-908a-final-impact-assessments-part-a-companies-
transparency-and-trust.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7R3-379N]. Part of the problem may be that
the latter survey included limited liability partnerships, while the former apparently did not.
See id. at 160 n.20.
17. See id. at 228 (“[O]ver 85% of the 67,000 companies with corporate directors file
accounts as if they were small companies.”).
18. Jillian Gauntlett, Update on Corporate Directorships, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
(Dec. 2010), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/32739/update-on-
corporate-directorships [https://perma.cc/FRJ5-GNSG] (“The corporate governance require-
ments for directors of UK listed companies to have the appropriate skills to undertake the
duties of directors, effectively rule out the use of corporate directors in the context of public
listed companies.”).
19. Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 155(1).
20. See Ellis, supra note 12, at 205 (stating that under the Companies Act “all companies
are required to have at least one director who is a natural person”).
21. Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, c. 26 § 87(4).
22. See Theresa Grech, Legal Changes Businesses Can Expect in 2017, SOUTHWEST-
BUSINESS (Jan. 25, 2017, 7:51 AM), http://www.southwestbusiness.co.uk/sectors/ professional-
services/legal-changes-businesses-can-expect-in-2017--theresa-grech--willans-25012017
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government to consider permitting exceptions in limited circum-
stances, as authorized by the statute.23 As of this writing (fall 2017),
the government had not yet defined the scope of such exceptions or
the situations in which they will be granted, but action was expected
in the near future.
II. WHY DO COMPANIES USE CORPORATE DIRECTORS?
Interestingly, a survey of fifty-five companies having at least one
corporate director reported that “31% saw no advantage to having
one, and 11% responded that they did not know what the advan-
tages of having one were.”24 While the small size of the sample
relative to the tens of thousands of U.K. companies with corporate
directors makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions from the survey,
it is interesting that so many of the surveyed firms were unable to
offer a legitimate reason for using entities as directors. As disclosed
below, perhaps they were unable to do so because corporate direc-
tors are often used for purposes at or over the edge of the law.25
Nevertheless, there are legitimate reasons for companies to use
corporate directors. In general, boards have three major functions.
First, although day-to-day operational decision making is properly
delegated to management, the board does have certain managerial
072120/ [https://perma.cc/N9R7-U5FL] (“It was originally thought that the ban would come
into force last October, but it now looks as though it is likely to be April or June this year.”).
Once implemented, the law makes it an offense by the company purporting to appoint a
corporate director, the non-natural person so appointed, and any “officer ... who is in default”
of both companies. 14 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶ 526 (5th ed. 2016). “Officer” is defined
for this purpose as a “director, manager or secretary, and any person who is to be treated as
an officer” by the company in question. Id. ¶ 316 (footnotes omitted). An officer is “in default”
“if he authorises or permits, participates in, or fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent”
the violation. Id.
23. See Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, c. 26 § 87(4) (“The Sec-
retary of State may make provision by regulations for cases in which a person who is not a
natural person may be appointed a director of a company.”); see also EXCEPTIONS PAPER, supra
note 15, at 4 (“[W]e seek views on circumstances where the use of corporate directors could
continue, under exceptions to the prohibition.”).
24. EXCEPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 8.
25. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (observing the disproportionate incidence of
corporate directors in cases of serious fraud). This inference is perhaps further supported by
the survey’s further finding that only 42 percent of surveyed companies would replace a
corporate director with a natural person if the former were banned. See IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
PAPER, supra note 16, at 180.
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functions. The Companies Act, for example, requires that the board
of directors approve the terms on which the company will merge
with another.26 More generally, the Corporate Governance Code
provides that all companies should have “a formal schedule of mat-
ters specifically reserved” to the board.27 It further requires an an-
nual report stating, inter alia, “which types of decisions are to be
taken by the board and which are to be delegated to management.”28
A major study of U.K. boards found some variance in how this
aspect of the board’s role was operationalized, but concluded that
“boards remain controllers of the strategic agenda.”29 The board
serves as the “ultimate arbiter of what constitutes the focus of the
company.”30 It sets the parameters within which management con-
ducts the day-to-day operations.31
Second, boards have a service function. Both individually and
collectively, board members provide advice and guidance to top
managers.32 This is an especially valuable and important role of the
nonexecutive directors.33 A diverse board can expand the company’s
network by providing interlocks with potential suppliers, customers,
sources of finance, and other potential suppliers of key organiza-
tional needs.34 Research suggests that nonexecutive directors, in
particular, play a valuable role in “‘opening doors’ for firms through
26. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 905(1) (“A draft of the proposed terms of the scheme
must be drawn up and adopted by the directors of the merging companies.”).
27. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 7 (2016) [herein-
after CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE], https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca7e94c4-b9a9-
49e2-a824-ad76a322873c/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-April-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R5WY-PU DN].
28. Id.
29. PHILIP STILES & BERNARD TAYLOR, BOARDS AT WORK: HOW DIRECTORS VIEW THEIR
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 52 (2001).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 51.
32. See Remus Valsan, Board Gender Diversity and the Enlightened Shareholder Value
Principle, 37 COMPANY LAW. 171, 175 (2016) (identifying the advisory role as one of three
main board functions).
33. See Colin Law & Patricia Wong, Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis
Between the UK and China, 16 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 350, 356 (2005) (“A non-
executive director usually performs an advisory role and is not involved in the day-to-day
management of the company.”).
34. See Valsan, supra note 32, at 175 (noting “the role of directors in providing and
maintaining resource networks that are essential for the company’s survival and success”).
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use of contacts.”35 Finally, directors have an important institutional
role in liaising with shareholders and other key company stake-
holders.36
Third, the board—especially its nonexecutive members—monitors
the performance of management.37 Indeed, as is also the case in the
United States, monitoring is the chief function of U.K. company
directors.38 U.K. boards do so by setting the broad policies and stra-
tegic framework within which management conducts the firm’s
business, reviewing and approving plans and budgets put forward
by management, setting management compensation, and wielding
the ultimate power to hire and fire managers.39
All of these functions were cited by U.K. companies surveyed as
advantages of corporate directors. To be sure, as noted above, 31
percent of the surveyed companies could not state any advantage
provided by corporate directors, but 24 percent stated that corporate
directors broadened the skill sets and knowledge possessed by the
board.40 Nine percent of the surveyed respondents stated corporate
directors provided greater continuity; 5 percent cited improved
efficiency; and 2 percent cited access to a wider network, access to
finance, and better decision making.41
These claims are far from fatuous. To the contrary, a corporate di-
rector in fact has many potential advantages over individual natural
persons.42 As to the board’s managerial function, a corporate direc-
tor likely will make better decisions than a single individual.43 Most
of what boards do involves exercising critical evaluative judgment,
35. STILES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 53.
36. See id. at 100-01 (describing the board’s institutional role).
37. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 27, at 9 (“Non-executive directors
should scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives
and monitor the reporting of performance.”).
38. See Valsan, supra note 32, at 175 (“The Anglo-American corporate governance liter-
ature traditionally places a great emphasis on the monitoring role of the board.”).
39. See STILES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 78-80 (reviewing the board’s control function).
40. IMPACT ASSESSMENTS PAPER, supra note 16, at 183.
41. Id.
42. This Section draws on work I have done elsewhere with Professor Todd Henderson of
the University of Chicago Law School. See generally Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 8.
43. See id. at 1097 (arguing that corporate directors that specialize in board service
“would make better decisions than current boards” because they “would have better infor-
mation, access to specialists with fewer conflicted interests, more person-hours available for
exercising judgment, better incentives, and so on”).
9
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assessing proposals put forward by management, rather than
original thinking.44 A considerable body of evidence demonstrates
that groups are superior to individuals at making such judgments.45
Assuming most of the companies that serve as corporate directors
themselves have multiple employees and directors, a corporate di-
rector brings to bear the combined knowledge and expertise of mul-
tiple individuals.46 Having multiple individuals serving collectively
as a corporate director also increases the number of man hours de-
voted by each slot in the board.47
In the exercise of its service role, the board’s function is to
“enhance a firm’s ability to raise funds, to add to the reputation of
the company through recognition of their name in the community,
and to deal with threats in the external environment.”48 By inter-
locking multiple boards of directors, the board facilitates access to
mission-critical resources by providing introductions, formal and
informal communication channels, and helping coordinate ongoing
relationships.49 A corporate director with multiple employees and
directors, each of whom has their own network of clients and
associates, should be far better at building a network of resources
on which the firm can draw than individual directors.
Finally, as to the board’s monitoring function, a corporate director
again has advantages over natural persons. In addition to the time
and knowledge advantages already cited, which are of significant
value in making informed assessments of management perfor-
mance, corporate directors may often have better incentives than
natural persons.50 At the very least, corporate directors should be no
worse than natural persons whose incentives to effectively monitor
44. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 30 (2002) (“[M]ost of what boards do requires the exercise of
critical evaluative judgment, but not creativity.”).
45. See id. at 12-19 (reviewing the empirical evidence on group decision making).
46. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1098 (arguing that a specialist corporate
director “combines the advantages of group decisionmaking with a group composition likely
to be better informed and motivated”).
47. See id. at 1077 (discussing time advantages of a specialized corporate director).
48. STILES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 16.
49. See generally Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate
Governance, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 669 (2015) (discussing the corporate governance function of
interlocking directorates).
50. See generally Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1081-96 (reviewing the
incentives a specialized corporate director has to be an effective monitor of management). 
10
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management “are fairly limited since they capture so little of any
gains and suffer so little of any losses from the decisions they
make.”51
In addition to these considerations, there are several practical
ways in which corporate directors can be useful. For example, in
Hong Kong, where corporate directors are also permitted,52 foreign
investors outside Hong Kong use corporate directors—typically
corporate service providers or financial institutions—as local nom-
inee directors of Hong Kong companies so as to facilitate prompt
handling of business matters such as signing documents.53 Where
directors travel frequently, using a corporate director helps ensure
that at least someone representing that director remains in town to
deal with business matters as they arise.54 Finally, in the corporate
group context, a parent corporation may appoint itself to the board
of directors of a subsidiary to exercise direct control.55
III. THE CASE AGAINST CORPORATE DIRECTORS
The stated rationale for restricting the use of corporate directors
was that they “bring about a lack of transparency and accountability
with respect to the individuals influencing the company.”56 At a
51. Id. at 1081.
52. See Ji Lian Yap, De Facto Directors and Corporate Directorships, 7 J. BUS. L. 579, 581
(2012) (noting that under Hong Kong law, public companies may not have corporate directors
but private companies—other than private companies that form a part of a corporate group
that includes a public company—may do so).
53. See E-mail from Hui Huang, Professor of Law & Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Fin. Regulation
& Econ. Dev., Faculty of Law, Chinese Univ. of H.K., to author (Feb. 10, 2017, 23:34 PST)
[hereinafter Huang email] (on file with author) (offering this example).
54. See id.
55. See id; see also Yap, supra note 52, at 582 (“[C]orporate directorships might be used
for legitimate reasons, for instance, a parent company being the corporate director of its
subsidiary to facilitate group cohesion.”).
56. DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST: ENHANCING THE
TRANSPARENCY OF UK COMPANY OWNERSHIP AND INCREASING TRUST IN UK BUSINESS—
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 44 (2014) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT RESPONSE], https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/304297/bis-14-672-transparency-
and-trust-consultation-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KXM-CAG6].
Similar concerns have been advanced in other countries in connection with rejecting pro-
posals to permit the use of corporate directors. See, e.g., Conway & Kavanagh, supra note 4,
at 151 & n.30 (noting that Ireland’s Company Law Review Group’s 2000 report argued that
changing the law to permit corporate directors would reduce director accountability); Yap,
supra note 52, at 581 (noting that the June 2011 report of Singapore’s Steering Committee
11
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2013 G7 summit, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron called for
global action against corruption, which he proposed accomplishing
through “greater transparency, fair tax systems and freer trade.”57
In July 2013, the U.K. Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills responded by promulgating a discussion paper advancing nu-
merous proposals to increase the transparency of company owner-
ship.58 The paper acknowledged that corporate directors can serve
legitimate purposes, but objected that they could also be used “to
conceal beneficial owners in a complex corporate structure and
across multiple jurisdictions to facilitate illegal activity.”59 Accord-
ingly, the paper requested comments on a proposal to prohibit
corporate directors.60
Concern about the use of corporate directors to conceal fraud and
other misconduct is legitimate. Despite the low frequency at which
U.K. companies use corporate directors, the Serious Fraud Office
estimated that corporate directors figured in a quarter of the cases
it investigated.61 A 2014 assessment of the need for reform con-
cluded that:
Corporate directors—one company (or legal person) as the
director of another—are inherently opaque with respect to the
natural person in fact controlling a company. Where someone
controls an appointed director—who might be acting irresponsi-
bly as a “front” for them—there is also scope for opacity and a
lack of accountability.
....
for Review of the Companies Act “took the view ... that there was no need to amend the law
to allow corporate directorships” because of concerns “about difficulties in ascertaining who
in fact controlled the company’s affairs, and the consequent lack of accountability”).
57. David Cameron, The Corruption Cure: Transparency, Taxes, Trade, GOV.UK (June
5, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-corruption-cure-transparency-taxes-trade-
article-by-david-cameron [https://perma.cc/LV23-K6PZ].
58. See DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, TRANSPARENCY & TRUST: ENHANCING
THE TRANSPARENCY OF UK COMPANY OWNERSHIP AND INCREASING TRUST IN UK BUSINESS—
DISCUSSION PAPER 5-6 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/212079/bis-13-959-transparency-and-trust-enhancing-the-transparency-
of-uk-company-ownership-and-increaing-trust-in-uk-business.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JYA-
QYZJ].
59. Id. at 50.
60. Id. at 52.
61. EXCEPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 6.
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The use of irresponsible “front” directors who allow themselves
to be controlled by another can similarly introduce opacity with
respect to that control and lead to reduced effectiveness of
corporate oversight.
Since all appointed directors have the same status under the
law, there is no means of identifying how many appointed di-
rectors are acting irresponsibly as a front for another, nor how
many people are seeking to control them. But we do know that
international organisations and UK law enforcement consider
such arrangements high risk in terms of facilitating crime such
as money laundering.62
Not surprisingly, the 2013 discussion paper elicited considerable
support for a broad prohibition of corporate directors from law
enforcement agencies, as well as numerous nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs).63
Nevertheless, the paper also elicited comments from business
representative organizations arguing that a complete prohibition of
corporate directors was unwarranted considering the potential
benefits offered by corporate directors.64 At the same time, however,
support for a change in the law increased if it were framed as a
partial prohibition permitting exceptions for situations in which the
risk of misuse is low.65 As we have seen, that is the approach the
government eventually adopted.66
IV. ASSESSING THE CASE AGAINST CORPORATE DIRECTORS
Concerns about transparency and accountability could be addres-
sed through disclosure and substantive regulation without sacrific-
ing the benefits corporate directors provide. Indeed, much of the
regulatory structure necessary is already in place.
62. IMPACT ASSESSMENTS PAPER, supra note 16, at 152, 155 (bullet points omitted).
63. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 44.
64. Id. at 45.
65. See id. (citing “group structures involving large (and listed) companies, pension funds,
charities, and Open-Ended Investment Companies (OEICs)” as examples of such situations).
66. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the legislation).
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A. Disclosure
As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously ob-
served, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.”67 The U.K. has already taken steps to
enhance corporate disclosures, which easily can be adapted to pro-
vide adequate information about the ownership structure of corpo-
rate directors.
In April 2016, the U.K. government implemented enhanced dis-
closure requirements with respect to most companies’ beneficial
owners.68 All persons with significant control (PSCs)—defined as an
individual who owns or controls more than 25 percent of the com-
pany’s stock or holds the right to appoint or remove a majority of the
board of directors, among other criteria69—who are known to the
company must be placed on a PSC register that includes the PSC’s
identity, date of birth, address, and other pertinent information.70
In addition, and more pertinent to present purposes, the PSC reg-
ister must also include “relevant legal entities” (RLEs), which are
defined, inter alia, as companies that are listed on an exchange or
are required to maintain their own PSC register.71 The register need
not contain information about the RLEs’ ownership structures
because the RLEs typically will have to maintain their own regis-
ters or otherwise provide such disclosures.72 As with the ban on
67. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
68. See Mark Taylor & David Elphinstone, Persons with Significant Control: Important
New Regulations That Are Now in Force, DORSEY (May 3, 2016), https://www.dorsey.com/
newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/05/persons-with-significant-control-regulation
[https://perma.cc/4KVP-ZXJF] (listing the five criteria imposed by the law).
69. See id. (listing the five criteria imposed by the law).
70. See Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, c. 26 § 790K (listing re-
quired disclosures).
71. Taylor & Elphinstone, supra note 68.
72. Id. The new legislation further provides that companies have a “positive duty to take
‘reasonable steps’ to identify PSCs.” Michael Roach, An Analysis of the UK’s New Register of
Beneficial Owners, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
d9dc907f-6997-4d7a-b9c5-4afa89c5a2d3 [https://perma.cc/5T54-UXUP]. What constitutes rea-
sonable steps will vary from case to case, “but the Government guidance makes it clear that
a company will have to demonstrate significant efforts in this regard.” Id. If a company is
unable to obtain the required disclosures from a suspected PSC, it “must ‘seriously consider’
whether it is appropriate to impose restrictions on any shares or rights they hold in the
company.” Id.
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corporate directors, the new requirements were justified as neces-
sary to improve corporate transparency and accountability.73
Similar disclosure requirements could be imposed on corporate
directors so that regulators and, if desired, the public, would know
the identities of the corporate director’s own directors, officers, and
major beneficial owners of its shares. To further promote account-
ability and transparency, such requirements could include a similar
positive duty on the part of both the company appointing the
corporate director and the company serving as the corporate director
to ensure that all relevant information is fully disclosed.
To ensure full transparency, moreover, the full ownership
structure of the corporate director should be part of the required
disclosure. Unlike RLEs, some corporate directors may be small
companies that are not required to maintain a PSC register or they
may be foreign companies. Accordingly, the disclosure should in-
clude the ultimate beneficial owner of the corporate director as well
as any intermediary corporations or other legal entities in the chain
of ownership.
There are several analogous requirements in U.S. law. The SEC
“requires disclosure of all twenty-five percent owners of direct
owners” of a registered broker-dealer, “their twenty-five percent
owners, and each successive twenty-five percent owner of a twenty-
five percent owner, continuing up the chain of ownership until a
reporting company is reached.”74 U.S. banking law likewise
“mandates disclosure of extensive information about entities in the
chain of ownership.”75 As these analogies suggest, it is possible to
condition regulatory privileges—such as using a corporate director—
on complete chain of ownership and control disclosure.
B. Liability Constraints
When a corporate director is involved in criminal or civil miscon-
duct, the entity may be held liable. The more serious question is
73. See Roach, supra note 72 (noting that the requirement “should be viewed in the wider
context of the UK Government’s commitment to promote greater corporate transparency”).
74. Form BD Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg. 4040, 4042 n.19 (proposed Jan. 19, 1995) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 249).
75. David L. Glass, So You Think You Want to Buy a Bank?, 73 ALB. L. REV. 447, 461
(2010).
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whether the ultimate beneficial owners of the corporate director can
be held liable. Being able to reach those individuals and hold them
liable will often be desirable from both a compensatory and deter-
rence perspective.
The principal means by which such individuals may be held re-
sponsible under U.K. law for the acts of a corporate director is the
de facto director doctrine.76 “A person will be deemed to have acted
in the capacity of a de facto director where that person performs
management functions of a type and in a manner consistent with
management functions ordinarily performed and associated with a
formally appointed director (a de jure director).”77 In the leading
case of Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. Holland, the U.K.
Supreme Court identified several factors relevant to determining
whether someone is a de facto director, such as
whether they were part of the company’s “governing structure”;
whether they were “truly in a position to exercise the powers
and discharge the functions of a director” of the company;
whether they had “assumed the status and functions of a com-
pany director” or “assumed to act as a director of the company.”78
The Hollands were a husband and wife who were shareholders and
directors of a trading company called Paycheck Services.79 “Pay-
check Services was the parent company of ‘Paycheck Directors,’”
76. See Stephen Griffin, Establishing the Liability of a Director of a Corporate Director:
Issues Relevant to Disturbing Corporate Personality, 34 COMPANY LAW. 135, 135 (2013)
(“Liability may be imposed against a de jure director, a de facto director ... and in circum-
stances where a statutory provision provides specifically, a shadow director of the company.”
(footnote omitted)).
A shadow director is defined by statute as “a person in accordance with whose directions
or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act.” Companies Act 2006, c.
46 § 251(1). It is suggested that
in analysing the attributes necessary to a finding that a person’s activities were
as either a de facto director or shadow director, the only notable distinction
between the two types of directorship would appear to be that while the former
must operate within the internal management structures of a company, the
latter is more likely (although not compelled) to operate outside the formal
internal management structures.
Griffin, supra, at 143.
77. Griffin, supra note 76, at 136.
78. Sealy, supra note 14, at 3; see Revenue & Customs Comm’rs v. Holland [2010] UKSC
51, [26]-[40] (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).
79. Sealy, supra note 14, at 1.
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which served as a corporate director for a number of affiliated com-
panies.80 Even though “Holland was the directing mind and will be-
hind it all,” a majority of the court held that Holland was not a de
facto director.81 The majority “placed a great deal of emphasis on the
importance of the principle of separate legal personality” and wor-
ried that the de facto director doctrine could swallow that prin-
ciple.82
As illustrated by Holland, U.K. company law has a strong tradi-
tion of respecting the separate legal personalities of incorporated en-
tities and their shareholders, directors, and officers.83 Indeed, while
the U.K. recognizes a doctrine of piercing the corporate veil similar
to that under U.S. law, U.K. courts are far less likely to do so than
their American counterparts.84
Strong policy reasons justify respecting the separate legal per-
sonality of an incorporated entity and its controlling person.85 Those
reasons in fact are sufficiently compelling that I have elsewhere pro-
posed that U.S. courts abolish the veil piercing doctrine.86 Limited
liability encourages risk taking by allowing shareholders to insulate
themselves from liability, for example, which encourages investment
and resulting economic growth.87 While it is true that limited lia-
bility allows shareholders to externalize some of the costs of risk
taking, the evidence shows that the introduction of limited liability
spurred economic growth.88
Conversely, as the Holland case illustrates, doctrines such as
de facto directorships and veil piercing are difficult to apply. In
80. Id. at 1-2.
81. Id. at 3.
82. SLAUGHTER & MAY, CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND DE FACTO DIRECTORSHIP—THE
SUPREME COURT REQUIRES “SOMETHING MORE” 3 (2011), https://www.slaughterandmay.com/
media/1626034/corporate-directors-and-de-facto-directorship-the-supreme-court-requires-
something-more.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN5Q-5WW5].
83. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 235 (2016) (“[T]he UK has a rich tradition of limited liability for
corporate entities.”). 
84. Id. at 241 (“British courts are more reluctant to pierce the veil or combine a corporate
group than American courts.”).
85. See, e.g., id. at 46-47, 50, 52 (reviewing policy arguments in favor of limited liability).
86. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479
(2001).
87. See BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 47.
88. See id. at 49-52.
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Holland, “it is difficult to differentiate between those of his acts
done as director of Paycheck and whatever other acts he carried out
in the business wearing other hats.”89 The doctrinal tests courts use
to make such distinctions, moreover, are inherently ambiguous. As
Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo observed of the U.S. version
of veil piercing, for example, it is “an enigmatic doctrine caught ‘in
the mists of metaphor.’”90 Accordingly, as Judge Frank Easterbrook
and Professor Daniel Fischel rightly argue, veil piercing “seems to
happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprinci-
pled.”91
Accordingly, I have argued that “the appropriate question is not
whether the shareholder used the corporation as his or her alter
ego, but whether the shareholder personally engaged in conduct for
which he or she ought to be held directly liable.”92 Additionally,
[i]n many nominal piercing cases, the plaintiff in fact could have
brought a direct action against the shareholder. In numerous
cases, for example, the individual defendant said or did some-
thing that misled the creditor. In others, the individual defen-
dant could be held liable either as a joint tortfeasor with the
corporate defendant or on a vicarious liability theory. Because
these examples capture the cases in which limited liability
seems most problematic (i.e., those involving misrepresentation
in connection with contract claims and deliberate externalization
of unreasonable risks in tort cases), abolishing veil piercing
would not leave deserving creditors without a remedy.93
Interestingly, this approach to the problem would be consistent
with the trend of U.K. law with respect to veil piercing. U.K. law
increasingly focuses on whether the corporation’s controlling person
has committed a wrong for which direct individual liability may be
imposed.94 As a U.S. court applying U.K. law explained,
89. Sealy, supra note 14, at 3.
90. Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 514 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58,
61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)).
91. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).
92. Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 516.
93. Id. (footnotes omitted).
94. See BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 241 n.32 (“Indeed, it appears that
British law may be trending in the direction we urge ... namely, substituting direct
18
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 59 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol59/iss1/3
2017] CORPORATE DIRECTORS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 83
[W]here an individual (“B”) has, by making fraudulent misrepre-
sentations, procured a contract between the plaintiff (“A”) and
a third party (“C”), and C subsequently breaches that contract,
any claim that A possesses against B sounds in tort rather than
in contract, “even where C is the creature of B.” Thus, where
“[t]he Claimants have their remedy ... in the form of an action
for fraudulent misrepresentation,” “[t]here is simply no need ...
to lift the veil at all.”95
British courts and regulators should take the same approach to
beneficial owners—and other controlling persons—of corporate
directors. When the individual commits fraud or other serious viola-
tions, the fact that he did so while acting through a corporation
should not bar imposition of direct personal liability. This approach
would be directly responsive to the accountability concerns motivat-
ing the ban on corporate directors. It is generally accepted that one
should not be held liable for harms one did not cause.96 Conversely,
however, where the controlling persons of a corporate director are
active participants in the harm-causing activity, they are properly
held responsible.
CONCLUSION
Although the U.K.’s century-old tradition of allowing corporate di-
rectors raised legitimate transparency and accountability concerns,
those concerns could have been addressed without the sweeping
shareholder liability for veil piercing.”).
95. In re Tyson, 433 B.R. 68, 89-90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (alterations in original) (quot-
ing Dadourian Grp. Int’l Inc. v. Simms, [2006] EWH (Ch) 2973 [686] (Eng. & Wales)), aff’d,
511 F. App’x 120 (2d Cir. 2013).
96. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 26 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“No party should be liable for harm it did not cause.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 5 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The defendant may be ‘subject to liability’ but may
escape it [if] ... his conduct may not have been the legal cause of the plaintiff’s harm.”);
Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 108
(1997) (“[T]he ethical justification for tort liability requires proof of causation, and that it is
not only inefficient, but also unfair, to require a defendant to devote resources to defending
and settling lawsuits for injuries that it did not cause”); John A. Robertson, Causative vs.
Beneficial Complicity in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2004)
(“Moral responsibility for a wrong requires both causation and complicity. One is not morally
responsible for an event unless one has caused that event with the intention, knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence necessary for moral culpability.”).
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prohibition imposed by the SBEEA. Given the legitimate uses of
corporate directors, as well as the potential for them to evolve into
BSPs, the U.K. should consider replacing that prohibition with a
regime allowing corporate directors but requiring extensive disclo-
sures of the director’s ownership structure and imposing personal
liability on the ultimate beneficial owner in appropriate cases. If
that proves politically impractical, the relevant authorities should
be willing to craft broad exemptions in situations where the risk of
misconduct is modest.97
97. As the U.K. government acknowledges, companies that use corporate directors “to
increase efficiency” are often subject to “extensive regulation” and have “high standards of
corporate governance.” IMPACT ASSESSMENTS PAPER, supra note 16, at 228. For example,
large companies might reasonably be thought to pose a lower risk of being used
as a shell company for illicit activity (since larger companies might be more
likely to be employing staff and producing goods, while those seeking to use a
company as a vehicle for illicit ends need only establish a small one to do so).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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